Language:
English
Year of publication:
2002
Titel der Quelle:
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Angaben zur Quelle:
5,2 (2002) 147-165
Keywords:
Holocaust (Jewish theology)
Abstract:
Raises the question of whether we have any reason to forgive (in a secular sense) the perpetrators of the Holocaust. Two types of arguments can be put forward against forgiving: metaphysical ones (e.g. only the victims can forgive the perpetrators, and most of the victims are dead) and moral ones (e.g. forgiveness is wrong because it harms the victims). Believes that, on examination, the objections to forgiveness are not persuasive. At the same time, two arguments in favor of forgiveness can be put forward: the presence of rational agency in the perpetrators, and the common human nature which they share with us. While the first argument seems to be not persuasive, the second has some force, albeit it is a rather weak reason. The existence of a phenomenon such as vicarious shame suggests a measure of our human solidarity even with the perpetrators of the Holocaust and thus shows a way to forgiveness. The necessary premise here is to regard the Holocaust as a crime against humanity, not against a particular group.
Note:
Appeared also in "Moral Philosophy and the Holocaust" (2003).
URL:
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