Introduction

Work is a central part of any human society and is influenced by the characteristics of the society in which it is undertaken (Budd 2011; Rosso et al. 2010). Changes in gender socialization and expectations among women and men regarding their work life may be related to social, economic, and political factors and help explain differences in work values among subgroups and societies (Hauff and Kirchner 2015).

As most religions—and the Western “Abrahamic” monotheistic religions among them—advance well-defined attitudes toward gender roles (Gaunt 2012; Taghizadeh et al. 2017), it is particularly important to note the gap in the literature addressing the impact of the juxtaposition of work, religion, and gender in light of its importance on attitudes and behaviors both toward women and of women at the workplace (Arifeen and Gatrell 2019; Kemp et al. 2015). This lacuna is particularly important in light of the fact that religious dictates regarding women and work often bring to the forefront possible tensions between the personal preferences of women and those of society regarding not only their professional lives, but also those concerning the fulfillment of their preferences regarding work values (Arifeen and Gatrell 2019; Freund et al. 2019; Kemp et al. 2015).

One central—but under-researched—matter is the potential impact of religion on attitudes toward work (King 2008). The dearth in research regarding the possible impact of religion and work is particularly keen with regard to the possible interaction between gender, religion, and work. This study examines the possible impact of religious identity on the work-related attitudes and aspirations of Israeli Jewish women, with a special focus on those from the fastest-growing sector of the Israeli population—HarediFootnote 1 (or Ultra-Orthodox) women.

There exists a unique work-related phenomenon in Israeli Haredi in which, due to the way certain religious precepts are interpreted, significantly more women participate in the labor market than men. Indeed, the workforce participation of Israeli Haredi women in 2019 stands at 77% (and 84% among non-Haredi Jewish women), which is about 150% of their male Haredi counterparts (Malach and Cahaner 2020).

Significantly, the Haredi community is the fastest growing population in Israel. In fact, they are one of the fastest growing populations in the world. Currently, the Haredim account for roughly 17% of the Jewish population and their annual natural growth rate is fast—4.2% per year since 2009, compared with 1.4% of the general Jewish population. (Malach and Cahaner 2020, Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics 2021) The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics anticipates that the Haredi population will triple over the next three decades and make up 30% of the total population of Israel by 2050.

This research has not only theoretical value associated with the study of the juxtaposition of religion and work in general, but the study of the work lives of Haredi women also has tremendous practical value for those interested in Israeli society, for those working with or managing Israeli Haredi women, and for those entrusted with advancing economic policy in Israel. Due to the tremendous value placed on men engaging in life-long religious study, women in Israeli Haredi society are typically charged with being the primary breadwinner, while having their workplace endeavors downgraded in importance by community norms regarding traditional gender-related familial roles (e.g., Caplan 2003). The vision of and relative value assigned to workplace activities by Israeli Haredi women have consequences for themselves, their communities, and the Israeli economy. This is the first study that examines the way in which work values and societal characteristics play out among the three largest groups of Israeli Jewish women: Secular, Traditional, and Haredi women.

Work Values and Aspirations: An Overview

Work values can be an important prism through which to examine the interface between individuals and the organizations in which they operate because values are relatively stable constructs that define what people believe to be fundamentally right or wrong (Lyons et al. 2007). Thus, work values provide researchers (and others) with a robust means to help us understand what people may believe is right or wrong in various work settings (Smola and Sutton 2002) and serve as a mechanism through which individual energies can be directed toward desired outcomes. Indeed, work values have been seen to be predictive of a variety of desirable individual and organizational work-related matters such as commitment, job satisfaction, productivity, and retention (Avdiaj and Ziberi 2019; Inabinett and Ballaro 2014; Vipinosa and Acevedo 2015).

Work-related values, then, can best be seen as a compass pointing the individual toward what they should put into work and expect out of it. The values themselves can be classified in several ways. Arguably, the most widely used was proposed by Elizur (1984) and distinguished between work values that are extrinsic, or a consequence of work (e.g., job security, salary) or intrinsic, associated with the work itself (e.g., intellectual stimulation, challenge) (Elizur 1984). Subsequent research has used the above system to examine work values across gender, cultures, generations, jobs, and organizations (i.e., Basinska and Dåderman 2019; Gesthuizen et al. 2019; Sharabi and Harpaz 2016). The Meaning of Work project (MOW—International Research Team, 1987) was a comparative study conducted in eight countries. The questionnaire examined 11 work goal preferences that included varied intrinsic and extrinsic values (e.g., variety, interest, autonomy, job security, and good pay). Our study will use this framework of work values to compare Haredi women and their traditional and secular counterparts. Next, we will focus on the possible interaction between work values and a particular aspect of culture: the Individualist–Collectivist underpinnings of culture.

Work Values in Individualist versus Collectivist Culture

Contractor (2022) notes that it is “an inescapable fact” that globalization will be a central feature of business in the foreseeable future. One of the critical features of the above is the impact of societal culture on the attitudes and actions of organizations and those who operate them. A central prism through which one can distinguish among cultures is where a culture falls on the continuum between “Individualism” and “Collectivism” (Hofstede 1980, 2011; Schwartz 2013; Triandis 2018). Individualism focuses on the rights and concerns of the individual, and Collectivism stresses the importance of community preferences and needs. It can be expected that the degree to which a society acknowledges and even advances either of the above may impact work values of those operating in that society. Indeed, the impact of the relative individualism/collectivism of culture has been shown to have significant individual- and organizational-level outcomes (e.g., Galanaki et al. 2020; Smale et al. 2019).

Table 1 presents some of the main differences between individualist and collectivist cultures, including either a self-directed focus on one’s autonomy and growth and individual preferences and outcomes (individualistic cultures) or on others’ focused view toward group cohesion and roles and group norms and needs (collectivistic cultures).

Table 1 Individualist versus Collectivist Culture*
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On the basis of Table 1 we can consider “interesting job,” “variety,” “good pay,” and “autonomy” as individualistic values, while “interpersonal relations” and “job security” can be considered as collectivist values. For example, since employees with individualistic values emphasize self-fulfillment (House et al. 2004; Ramesh and Gelfand 2010), they may adversely react to the inability to fully use their innate skills and accumulated skills and knowledge in a job due to a lack of such self-fulfillment. In contrast, workers with collectivistic values may be dissatisfied in situations in which there is a lack of emphasis on group harmony, mutual obligations among employees, and responsibility to the organization (House et al. 2004; Ji et al. 2012). In light of the significance of these attitudes to the workplace, it is important to have a framework to gauge the relative importance of the above values to better understand the workplace. The Meaning of Work project (MOW 1987) is such a framework. The MOW was the pioneering research program, examining different goals, values, and preferences that employees may express. It has been used in hundreds of studies throughout the world, and remains the leading research program (see Kay and Sharabi 2021 for a review). It will be employed here to measure work-related attitudes salient to this study.

The Israeli Context

The Economic Framework

The current research was undertaken in Israel. Israel can best be viewed as an “ideological start-up” whose economy has evolved over the years from one based on the socialistic ideas of its Labor Zionist founders to an economy directed by market forces (Kay 2012a). Since the liberalization of the Israeli economy in the mid-1980s, Israel has experienced enormous economic growth (Sharabi et al. 2019). As might be expected, this rapid economic growth, along with support for private enterprise, modernization of agriculture and industry, a high degree of social mobility, and a growth of both the middle class and spreading urbanization all caused major societal changes in values (Anderson et al. 2017; Sharabi and Harpaz 2016; Wonglimpiyarat 2016). In the case of Israel, the above propelled non-Haredi society to rapidly become more individualistic and more materialistic in recent decades (Abbou et al. 2017; Kay 2012b; Sharabi and Harpaz 2011).

Alongside changes in societal norms related to individualism, religious identity is also an important prism through which Israeli society can be better understood. The following is an examination of that matter.

Religious Identities in Israeli Society

Of course, for the purposes of this research, it is important to understand that Israel is a country in which 75% of the population is Jewish and Jewish values predominate, with the clearest demarcation among Israel’s Jewish majority being along religious lines. According to Stolz and Uuneir’s (2019) definition of religious groups and individual-level religiosity, the main religious subgroups in Israel are defined by the degree to which religion plays an active role in their overall group culture. As Judaism is a practice-oriented religion, these groups are divided on the basis of the strictness of their adherence to traditional religious law or Halacha, with secular and Haredi Jews being located at the two opposing ends of the spectrum and traditional Jews and Orthodox in between them. For the purpose of this study, we have chosen to examine the three largest populations within the Israel Jewish community: (1) those who define themselves as Secular, (2) those who define themselves as Traditional, and (3) those who define themselves as Haredim; in total they make up 89% of the Jewish population in Israel.

The Secular Sector

The largest portion of Israeli Jews (40%) identify as Secular (Reingold 2021). This group is characterized by their disengagement from a variety of personal and lifestyle constraints associated with Jewish law or Halacha (such as those dealing with dietary restrictions, prayer, and Sabbath observance). While members of this group may observe certain holiday and life cycle traditions, the above are related more to a cultural or national identity than to any theological belief system. They tend to be very interested in and accepting of modern “Western” culture and values and strive for freedom from what they may view as “religious coercion” in the Israeli public sphere.

The Traditional Sector

The next largest sector with regard to religious identity is the traditional sector, which makes up 38% of Israeli Jews (Fleishman and Gubman 2014). That sector spans the greatest range of religious observances, with various levels of adherence to Jewish law. In fact, while some members of this group have lifestyles very much influenced by religious doctrines, that observance tends to be more flexible and sporadic. Like those in the secular sector, people here are open to and consumers of “Western” culture and values (Sharabi and Polin 2020).

The Haredi Sector

The third largest but fastest growing sector is the Haredi sector, which currently makes up 17% of the Jewish population (and 13% of the total population) in Israel (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 2021). Haredim see themselves as the authentic perpetuators of “true Judaism” and are extremely fastidious with regard to the observance of Jewish law that permeates every aspect of their personal, familial, communal, and public lives. The Haredi sector is an almost classic example of an enclave society (Almond et al. 2003; Sharabi and Polin 2020) that expends extraordinary efforts to guard its members from the destructive consequences of “modernity” (Caplan and Stadler 2012). They not only reject “Western” culture and values, which they view as corrupt and corrupting, and seek to control and reduce the impact of the above via control of access to the internet and social media in particular (Kay and Levine 2019; Sharabi and Kay 2021), but are also, typically, suspicious of and resistant to government policies, such as those associated with COVID-19, that may somehow compromise current Haredi norms and beliefs (Block and Zalcberg 2022).

The gravity of this self-selected role was greatly magnified by the Holocaust, which led to the destruction of the great bulk of Haredi Jewry as well as its centers of religious learning. In the wake of the above, Haredi leadership in Israel succeeded in eliciting draft exemptions for 400 male seminary students from the universal draft that exists in Israel to rebuild the foundations of religious scholarship. Those deferments were contingent on the seminary students refraining from seeking employment.

With time, the rise of Haredi political power and the previously mentioned demographic growth, the number of seminary students making up this “community of learners” grew from the original 400 exemptions 200-fold to its current state of roughly 83,000 full-time seminary students. Thus, over the last few decades, Haredi society has been characterized by a lifestyle based on the idea that men should strive to remain in religious seminaries studying the holy books for as long as possible, while women should strive to work to enable that endeavor (Caplan 2003; Kay and Sharabi 2022). Resulting from the above, more Haredi women (77%) than men (53%) participate in the workforce (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 2021; Malach and Cahaner 2020).

While contemporary Israeli Haredi society acknowledges the unique and important role women play in providing the material wherewithal to sustain this arrangement, women are urged to remember that their main job remains to be good spouses and mothers, keeping a Torah-observant home (Caplan 2003; Freund et al. 2019). Their occupational efforts, on the other hand, are to be seen as an ex-post facto necessity for sustaining Torah learning, rather than a place to seek personal satisfaction and growth (Blumen 2002).

An important and as of yet undetermined matter is what exactly the work-related attitudes and aspirations of Israeli Haredi are. This will be the first study that examines that matter while comparing those attitudes and aspirations to their counterparts from the secular and traditional Jewish communities in Israel. As such, this study helps to close the gap regarding the juxtaposition of religiosity, gender, and work goals and values. It does so within an understudied and important population and within the framework of a central structure addressing the study of work-related values: the Meaning of Work project (MOW 1987). Thus, the knowledge gained here has both theoretical and practical, that is, policy-related, value as Haredi women take an increasingly more central place in the Israeli workplace.

Hypotheses

Israeli society has been seen to have grown increasingly individualistic over the last 30 years; particularly, the secular Jewish-Israeli population (Hermann et al. 2012; Kasler et al. 2021; Sharabi et al. 2019). With that, Israeli society is multifaceted and the shift to individualism has been less evident in the more religious elements of the Jewish-Israeli populace (Arieli and Sagiv 2018; Or and Berkovich 2021). This is particularly true for the Haredi society that, as an enclave society, has been far less exposed to mass media and Western secular culture (Kay and Levine 2019; Sharabi and Kay 2021).

Based upon the significant differences in the exposure to and acceptance of “Western” values among Haredim, we believe that:

Hypothesis 1

There will be a higher similarity between traditional and secular women than between traditional and Haredi women regarding work values.

As noted, Haredi society is communal in nature, with individuals self-identifying with specific groups within the general community and dressing according to the codes of that community. Indeed, while secular Israeli Jewish society is closer to the individualistic pole of the spectrum, individualism is extremely frowned upon in religious circles, with individuals directed toward the acceptance of and allegiance to the community norms and needs (Cahaner and Shilhav 2012; Leon 2009). Thus, we expect that:

Hypothesis 2

The importance of interesting work, variety, learning new things, good pay, and autonomy will be highest among secular women and lowest among Haredi women.

Hypothesis 3

The importance of interpersonal relations and job security will be highest among Haredi women and lowest among secular women.

Haredi society is very family centered and has the highest rate of marriage and births in Israel (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 2021; Kay and Sharabi 2022). As noted, in mainstream Haredi society women are expected to be both the “breadwinners” and the “bread-bakers”—with prime responsibility for the home. As such, they simply (or not) have two full shifts (Hochschild and Machung 2012).‏ On the basis of the above, we believe that:

Hypothesis 4

Convenient hours will be the most important among Haredi women and the least important among secular women.

Method

The Sample

Data for this study were culled in 2016 via the Meaning of Work (MOW) questionnaire, developed by the MOW-International research team (1987). Two separate samples were combined for the study. Haredi respondents (N = 120) were accessed via a convenience “snowball sampling,” a widely used method to undertake research within the Israeli Haredi population (e.g., Malovicki et al. 2018). They were able to choose to fill in the survey’s questionnaire either in writing or online.

The second sample was collected in 2018 as part of a continuing series of cross-sectional studies that were undertaken in 1981, 1993, and in 2006 on representative samples of the Jewish Israeli labor force. As was the case in previous studies (Sharabi and Harpaz 2011, 2016), this sample was drawn on the basis of the specifications of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (2017) (1 year before the sample was executed) regarding Israeli Jewish working women and men (by gender, age, education, and more) representing the Jewish labor force (excluding those in the Haredi labor force, as was the case in the previous studies). Since this study focuses on women, we excluded the data regarding men in the labor force and included women who were randomly selected on the basis of the previously noted specifications of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics.

Interviewers made telephone calls according to the prescribed sampling configuration and asked for the agreement of the women to be interviewed. In cases where they refused to participate in the study, interviewers called the next one on the list. From approximately 1100, only 471 women agreed to complete the survey (response rate of 43%), and each interview lasted about 25 min. Of these, 309 women identified as secular, 138 as traditional, and 24 as religious. As this last group was extremely small, it was decided to exclude them from the study, leaving that group with 447 completed surveys.

Differences in data collection stem from the fact that the current study is the product of a collaboration of two researchers with data based on the same questionnaire. Due to our concern that Haredi women might not answer the question according to the instructions (to rank order all 11 items from the most important to the least important), we checked the data and found that the data (from filling in the question regarding the ranking of work goals) were as accurate as those who were interviewed. Therefore, it can be reasonably assumed that results were not impacted in any particular manner due to differences in data collection.

Thus, the total sample consists of 567 employed Israeli Jewish women: 309 secular, 138 traditional, and 120 Haredi. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the demographic characteristics of respondents by level of religiosity. Haredi women, though younger, are much more likely to be married and have more children than their secular and traditional counterparts. The occupational status of the three groups is similar, as are hours worked. Secular women were the most likely, and Haredi women least likely, to hold academic degrees. Finally, while there are no statistically significant differences among the groups in terms of occupational status, secular women have the highest salary and Haredi women have the lowest.

Table 2 Demographic distribution of women (means and frequencies) according to religiosity degree
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Dependent Variable: Measurement of Work Goals

The measurement of work goals utilized in the present study is based on the Meaning of Work questionnaire constructed by the MOW-International Research Team (1987). Respondents were asked the following question:

Regarding the nature of your work life: How important to you is it that your work life contains the following:

  1. 1.

    A lot of opportunities to learn new things

  2. 2.

    Good interpersonal relations (supervisors, coworkers)

  3. 3.

    Good opportunity for upgrading or promotion

  4. 4.

    Convenient work hours

  5. 5.

    A lot of variety

  6. 6.

    Interesting work (work that you really like)

  7. 7.

    Good job security

  8. 8.

    A good match between your job requirements and your abilities and experience

  9. 9.

    Good pay

  10. 10.

    Good physical working conditions (such as light, temperature, cleanliness, low noise level)

  11. 11.

    A lot of autonomy (you decide how to do your work)

Respondents were requested to rank order all 11 items from the most important (11) to the least important (1).

For purposes of the regression analyses presented in Table 4, each goal was considered a separate dependent variable, using the categories of how important it was rank ordered by the respondents (from 11, the most important, to 1, the least important).

Independent Variables: Measurement of Sociodemographic Variables

The individual independent variables are continuous variables of age, working hours, number of children, and a dichotomous variable of gender (1, men; 2, women) and family status (1, single; 2, couple/married). Monthly gross income in 2016 was about 9000 NIS (New Israeli Shekels). Since most of the women had income below the average, we divided them into three categories according to their monthly salaries: (1) much below average (less than 4500 NIS); (2) below average (between 4501 and 8999 NIS), and (3) higher than average (9000 or more NIS).

Education is measured on a scale reflecting the highest level of education achieved, ranging from: (1) secondary school or less, (2) post-secondary education, and (3) academic degree (undergraduate degree and higher). Occupational status is measured on a scale ranging from: (1) low occupational status (blue- and white-collar workers), (2) mid-level occupational status (junior managers and middle managers), and (3) high-level occupational status (senior and top managers, self-employed, and professional).

The degree of religiosity in both samples was based on self-report measures. To ensure that the respondents in the Haredi group were indeed such, they were asked to indicate with what sector of that community they identified (along the lines of the previously noted divisions). The other respondents were simply asked to self-define their degree of religiosity (secular or traditionalist).

Findings

As expected, there are wider differences between Traditional and Haredi women (five work value differences) than between Traditional and Secular women (three work value differences). Thus, Hypothesis 1 was confirmed.

We tested hypothesis 2 regarding the relative importance of various work goals among individuals from the three groups through an analysis of variance (ANOVA). Table 3 presents the results of this analysis. As expected, secular women had the highest need for variety and learning new things, while Haredi women expressed the lowest need. In addition, secular women had the highest need for interesting work, but traditional (and not Haredi women) have the lowest need. There were no differences found among the three groups regarding individualistic-related values of good pay and autonomy. Thus, the above findings refute most of Hypothesis 2.

Table 3 Means and rankingsa differences of work goals among Secular, Traditional, and Ultra-Orthodox women
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As expected, coming from a more “collectivist” society, the importance of interpersonal relations was the highest among Haredi women, but it was the Traditional (and not the Secular) who expressed the lowest interest in this matter. Regarding the other collectivistic value of job security, there were no differences among the three groups. Thus, the findings only partially confirm Hypothesis 3.

As expected in Hypothesis 4, Secular women expressed the least interest in convenient work hours than Haredi women. However, their level of interest in the above was not significantly different from Traditional women. With that, both the importance of the opportunity to advance via promotion and a good match between job requirements and abilities and experience increased with the degree of religiosity.

Due to significant demographic differences among the three groups (see the literature review and the sample characteristics displayed in Table 1), a linear regression analysis was executed to examine the extent to which demographic variables may account for the significant differences in work goals among the groups (Table 4).

Table 4 Linear regression analysis (standardized beta) of work goalsa according to demographic variables
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As can be seen, overall, sociodemographic factors have a limited impact on work goals among the sample population. Degree of religiosity is positively correlated with the goals of promotion (β = 0.15, P < 0.01) and convenient hours (β = 0.09, P < 0.05). Additionally, as earlier portrayed in Table 3, they are correlated with the goals of job requirements and individual abilities and experience (β = 0.15, P < 0.01) and correlated negatively with the goals of learning (β = −0.14, P < 0.01) and variety (β = −0.15, P < 0.001). Level of education has a considerable impact on work goals, and it is correlated positively with interest in learning (β = 0.14, P < 0.001) and finding interest in work (β = 0.24, P < 0.001). With that, it is negatively correlated with the importance of convenient hours (β = −0.09, P < 0.05), good pay (β = −0.11, P < 0.05), and work conditions (β = −0.15, P < 0.01). Finally, age negatively correlated with promotion (β = −0.19, P < 0.001) and pay (β = −0.14, P < 0.05), while positively correlating with the need for job security (β = 0.17, P < 0.01) and matching between job requirements and one’s abilities/experience (β = 0.18, P < 0.01).

Discussion

Despite both the theoretical value and important practical implication due to their growing importance in the Jewish world in general, and in Israel in particular, there are no studies that have examined occupational values of Haredim. This is the first study to examine work-related values among Israeli Haredi women in comparison to their Secular and Traditional counterparts.

As noted by Peled and Peled (2018), Israeli society is a diverse, multifaceted culture. Intriguingly, while some segments of it are becoming increasingly exposed to and accepting of global trends, among them more individualistic ideas, the fastest growing population, the Haredim, are suspicious of and resistant to the above. At the same time, Haredi women in Israel find themselves in more diverse jobs and organizations (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 2021). This dynamic provides an interesting and somewhat unique opportunity to examine the juxtaposition of religion and work in a society undergoing significant changes relevant to the above.

We sought to explain differences in work values among the three groups through the prism of the individualism–collectivism continuum due to what seems to be a growing dichotomy regarding the above between secular and religious individuals in Israel. However, the only values that were explained by this theory were that the highest need for interpersonal relationships (collectivistic value) was among Haredi women and the highest need for interesting work, variety, and learning new things (individualistic values) was among Secular women. It seems that a more nuanced understanding of the work-related experiences of these populations is called for, and some ideas regarding that will be discussed below.

It seems that other characteristic differences may explain the differences. First, as expected, convenient work hours were seen as least important for Secular women and most important for Haredi women, perhaps reflecting the logistic needs of the latter as they get married younger and subsequently have markedly more children than both Secular and traditional women. This in itself is not surprising as the importance of convenient working hours for working mothers is well established (e.g., Connerley and Wu 2016). However, Haredi women might be seeking out this flexibility, not due to individualistic impulses, but rather communal concerns.

Indeed, as mainstream Haredi women typically have taken it upon themselves to “do their part” and are willing to serve as both the main bread-makers and the main breadwinners (Buchbinder et al. 2015; Caplan 2003), their work-related activities may, perhaps, best be seen as a “calling”—as it is motivated by what they believe to be God’s summons to allow their husbands to engage in full-time religious study for the “common good” (Blustein 2001; Duffy and Dik 2013). Thus, their concern for their communal obligations may indirectly accentuate among these women the value of both (1) growth and development at the workplace to increase their own human capital (Freund et al. 2019; Kay and Sharabi 2022) and (2) the importance of salary. As such, though these values are most often associated with individualism, among Haredi women they may be communal in nature. Further research is needed to better explicate the precise motivations of these women regarding these possible work-related outcomes.

There has been increased research interest in the complexity of the juxtaposition of religious dictates concerning gender roles and familial and communal economic needs among employed women in more traditional societies (Buchbinder et al. 2015; Taghizadeh et al.2017). The current study that focused on Israel’s fastest growing community, Haredi Jews and is the first to examine work-related values of Israeli women through the prism of religiosity, adds to that literature.

Data regarding the unique economic role assumed by these women, perhaps, can also be edifying regarding an emerging global reality in which women play an increasingly central economic role, often as the sole breadwinners. The research points to both positive personal outcomes of work-related activities along with other, less positive, consequences. What is certain is that as women continue to play more central occupational and economic roles throughout the world, there is a need to continue, expand, and better articulate the dynamics of this phenomenon. The knowledge generated via studies of this kind can add to both the theoretical understanding of women and work as well as provide information that can contribute to the development and execution of organizational strategy and nation-level public policy appropriate to this new reality.

Some of the differences in work goals’ importance can be explained by the “scarcity hypothesis,” which assumes that individual preferences reflect the socioeconomic surroundings, where individuals bestow a more subjective value on issues having relatively little to offer them and/or do not answer their needs (Inglehart 1997; Hauff and Kirchner 2015). For example, in societies where women are prevented or must overcome obstacles to enter the labor market, work becomes more and more important in their lives compared with women who do not have such restrictions (Sharabi et al. 2020). The scarcity hypothesis may explain the greater importance Haredi women attribute to promotion opportunities and to the compatibility of job requirements with personal abilities and experience when compared with Traditional and Secular women. The high preference for these work goals may illustrate the dissatisfaction many Haredi women experience as a result of working in positions not matching their education, experience, and/or expertise. Haredi society has relatively clear norms and rules of conduct in regard to gender duties in the various areas of life, including in work life. According to those norms, women are expected to work in a feminine “respectable” job (i.e., in the fields of education, welfare, and health services) that does not interfere with family duties, and are directed to see work as a material necessity and not as a personal or spiritual value (Chudzikowski et al. 2011; Malach and Cahaner 2020).

Related to the above, Secular and Traditionalist women tend to have both more diverse occupational opportunities in the labor market and likely more occupational flexibility due to having fewer children. This situation may also reflect difficulties Haredi women may have due to employment restrictions (i.e., working in places in which modesty is maintained). This may explain the fact that only 2% of Haredi women work in public administration as compared with 10% among other Jewish women (Malach and Cahaner 2020). Furthermore, due to the patriarchal nature of Haredi society, Haredi women may be less likely to climb the organizational hierarchy ladder in organizations within that society (Freund et al. 2019; Munro 2021). This may limit the ability of Haredi women to fully realize their occupational potential.

The relationships between economic and social development and values related to individualism and collectivism and socioeconomic status can also explain the differences in work values of Haredi and non-Haredi women as two distinguishable social classes. According to Triandis (2018) and Hofstede (1980, 2011) the main characteristics of individualistic societies are higher economic development, high social mobility, strong development of the middle class, more modern industry, pragmatic educational system, and exposure to mass media.

On the basis of the above, we can see that the non-Haredi Jewish society displays individualistic characteristics, while the Haredi society reflects collectivistic characteristics. Significantly, the collectivist nature of Haredi society has led to the creation of what can be termed an internal “Haredi Welfare State” offering community members, such as these working women, types of community support that may make it easier to balance work and home responsibilities. This support is not available to non-Haredi women in Israel (Haredi Research Group 2017).

Haredi society itself has lower socioeconomic status compared with non-Haredi Jewish society. In 2018, 42% of Haredi families lived in poverty compared with 11% among non-Haredi Jewish families. The above has been seen as an outcome of the very high fertility rate, lower participation in the labor market (especially among men), and lower income of Haredim as compared with non-Haredi Jewish families (Malach and Cahaner 2020). Additionally, Haredi society tends to reject modern Western culture and values, so they minimize and control access to social media (Kay and Levine 2019; Sharabi and Kay 2021). They tend to live in segregated localities and mostly work within their community, which is itself underdeveloped economically and technologically when compared with non-Haredi localities (Cahaner et al. 2012; Sharabi and Polin 2020). Haredi education focuses on religious studies and rejects pragmatic studies (e.g., mathematics, science, technology, languages), particularly with regard to male students. According to the above, we can view them as a classic example of an enclave social class (Almond et al. 2003; Sharabi and Polin 2020) distinguished from non-Haredi society by social, economic, and political identity values that reflect and reinforce these differences.

One of the factors that restrict the integration of Israeli Haredi women into the labor market is their fertility rate, which may prevent them from successfully undertaking full-time jobs. It is significant to note that while 77% of their working hours are from part-time jobs, only 37.7% of the working hours of non-Haredi counterparts came from part-time work. This matter may contribute to lower economic status among Haredi families, as it is the women who are most often the breadwinners, as noted above (Malach and Cahaner 2020).

Finally, it is important to note that in recent years Israeli Haredi women are increasingly found in new and less traditional fields (i.e., finance, high tech, etc.) as they may increasingly seek jobs offering opportunities for personal interest and growth (Freund et al. 2019). Generating more opportunities to work from home within such fields seems to be a useful way to allow these women to work more hours while balancing domestic and professional requirements, thus contributing to their personal and occupational well-being. With that, such work—if undertaken at home—may impact both Haredi working women and their attitudes toward work and home as they actually “blur” the boundary between the multiple identities and social networks that they may have (Katz and Aakhus 2002). As noted by Shahar (2020), the retention of such boundaries can be seen as central to Haredi identity.

The limitations of this study relate to the sample and measure used. As noted, the sample did not include individuals who defined themselves as “religious,” which currently makes up roughly 11% of the Jewish population in Israel (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 2019). Furthermore, the sample of Haredi women and the sample of secular and traditional women were collected using different methods (convenient and representative, respectively). As noted, the preferred work goals measure is based on the rankings of 11 one-item goals that was based on responses to one question. Using single-item measures and ranking measures may not be optimal. However, it is important to note that this measure was built and used by the MOW research team in eight countries (MOW 1987) and later served as the basis of a wide variety of studies conducted in China (Westwood and Lok 2003), Israel (Sharabi and Harpaz 2011), USA (Richards and Corney 2011), and elsewhere. The findings show that this measurement can reflect the differences in work goal preferences over time.

To better understand the matters addressed in this study, future research should be undertaken that includes women from the Religious-Zionist community, with special attention directed at differences that have emerged within that community in recent years. Furthermore, it would also be important to undertake a study examining differences in workplace-related values between Haredi women (who typically are the main breadwinners in the community) and Haredi men. Finally, COVID-19 and its impact on the workplace makes it important to revisit the matters examined here to see if and how COVID-19 may have impacted the specific workplace-related matters examined here, particularly in light of the post-pandemic growth in remote work and its possible impact on working mothers (Kay et al. 2022).