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  • Loving the Neighbor:Some Reflections on Narcissism
  • Michael Oppenheim (bio)

Post-Philosophical philosophers explore “the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the various ways of talking that our race has invented.”1

Richard Rorty

The two biblical commandments in Leviticus to love the neighbor and to love the stranger seem to ground that love of the other in a more original, basic, or given love of the self. This essay will explore the ways that three modern Jewish philosophers of relation, Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, and Emmanuel Levinas address these commandments, since for them, love of the other, and not self-love, grounds the self—at least the authentic self, and in this sense is primary, basic, or original. The treatment begins with a discussion of rabbinic glosses on the meaning of these commandments and will also focus on narcissism and self-other relations in Freud and two significant post-Freudian psychoanalytic theorists, W.R.D. Fairbairn and Stephen Mitchell, which mirror the opposing standpoints of the Rabbis and the three Jewish philosophers. It concludes with brief suggestions concerning the significance of these two models of love in terms of an array of disciplines and theories.

The book of Leviticus contains both immortal commandments, to love the neighbor and the stranger.2 Leviticus 19:18 states, “You shall not take vengeance or bear any grudge against the sons of your own people, but you shall love your neighbor as yourself: I am the Lord,” while Leviticus 19:34 declares, “The stranger who sojourns with you shall be to you as the native among you, and you shall love him as yourself; for you were strangers in the land of Egypt: I am the Lord your God.”3 There is also a formulation of the latter commandment in Deuteronomy 10:19, which does not directly allude to the self, “Love the sojourner therefore; for you were sojourners in the land of Egypt.”

These two commandments of love (ahavah) are part of the 613 divine commands, the essence of Torah, that the Rabbis affirmed were given to Moses at Sinai and that were to punctuate and mold the everyday life of the Jewish people. The task of the Rabbis was to teach [End Page 47] and explain the meaning and implications of these biblical injunctions. The traditional biblical commentators seemed to find a dual problematic in fulfilling their tasks in terms of these particular injunctions. They had to translate the commandments to love into specific requirements, that is, to concretize that injunction to elicit and direct that elusive, if also tremendously powerful, passion of love. The effort of concretizing, in this case, loving the other through acts of love, constitutes one of the foremost strengths of the Rabbis.4 In reference to loving the neighbor (Lev. 19:18), for example, Maimonides (1135–1204) includes such social obligations as visiting the sick, comforting the mourners, and giving a dowry to the bride.5 The love of the stranger entails, according to the Rabbis, providing for such fundamental needs as food and dress, which are alluded to in the verse previous to the Deuteronomy stipulation, where it states (Deut. 10:18) that God “loves the sojourner, giving him food and clothing.”

The more interesting problem, in terms of this exposition, refers to rabbinic discussions concerning the relationship between love of the neighbor/stranger and love of the self. The Rabbis felt compelled to attend to this “as oneself ” (kamokhah). Thus, Nahmanides (1194–1270), in a very influential commentary on the Leviticus neighbor-love, held that the command could not be understood in a literal sense. He wrote:

This is an expression by way of overstatement, for a human heart is not able to accept a command to love one's neighbor as oneself … However, [because of human nature] he will still not want him to be his equal, for there will always be a desire in his heart that he should have more of these goods than his neighbor.6

Nahmanides interpreted the verse to mean that the individual should desire the overall well being of the neighbor, as one desired the good for oneself. In a similar vein Maimonides wrote:

By this injunction we...

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