



Right-wing Extremism in Hungary

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- Main actor of right-wing extremism in Hungary is the *Jobbik* party, which won about 15 per cent of the votes in the European elections of 2009 as well as in the general elections of 2010. Being the third party in Hungarian Parliament, it broadly succeeded in its agenda setting. Ruling *Fidesz* party of Prime Minister Orbán took over several bullet points of the *Jobbik* extremist party programme and adopted them as part of the government's policy.
- *Jobbik's* discourse is a mixture of anti-communism, anti-gypsyism, nationalism and hostility towards elites, particularly »all-corrupt« politicians. Obviously, there is a response to these – often very simplified – prejudices in the Hungarian population: More than one third of the voters can be considered as anti-democracy, anti-EU and against market economy.
- Since the end of communism, the Hungarian society has undergone deep changes. Today, only less than one third of the population considers itself as more or less progressively orientated. The main left party *MSZP* has crashed in the last elections and today represents not more than 20 per cent of the votes.



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1. The Growth of Right-wing Extremism in Hungary

The radical right-wing party *Jobbik* was founded in 2003 out of the Right-wing Youth Community. Although it initially won only 2.2 percent of the vote in the 2006 elections,¹ after that its popularity as the main group at the far-right end of the political spectrum increased by leaps and bounds. The real breakthrough came in 2007 with the emergence of the Hungarian Guard – an affiliated paramilitary organisation – which helped to make *Jobbik* generally known in Hungary. In 2009 the party won 14.77 percent of the vote in elections to the European parliament, greatly exceeding both expectations and the results of opinion polls. A year later, in the 2010 Hungarian parliamentary elections, it was able to increase its popularity still further and became the third-strongest party in the Hungarian parliament with 16.67 percent of the vote.

Since the political upheavals of 1989/90, there has been no other example of a party »coming from nowhere and fighting its way to the position of a middle-ranking party with 15 percent [of the vote]«. ² What is more, it emerged on the political stage not only with a degree of radicalism unparalleled in Hungarian politics, but also voicing overtly racist and anti-Semitic rhetoric and candidly addressing a number of issues previously considered taboo. It also succeeded in exerting considerable influence on the other parliamentary parties.

We may briefly identify four underlying reasons for this growth in right-wing extremism:

Society Receptive to Radicalism

A study³ conducted in 2012 shows that, perceived in market terms, there is certainly a demand among the Hungarian electorate for a party promulgating right-wing extremist ideas. Typical characteristics and attitudes of the sector of society that votes for such a party are prejudice, hostility to the system and far-right values

as well as a general feeling of pessimism or fear about the future. According to the study, 48 percent of the Hungarian population can be described as extremely prejudiced, a very high proportion by European standards. Prejudiced voters tend to have major reservations about minorities, mainly the Sinti und Roma and migrants from poorer countries, and a majority of them would also like to see the rights of homosexuals curbed. Among the over-16-year-olds, 34 percent are hostile to the system as well as towards Hungarian democracy and generally reject the market economy, and EU institutions, while 43 percent of them hold far-right values. Since the beginning of the economic and financial crisis both the »fear factor« and the level of dissatisfaction have grown, which also works to the advantage of the political right.

The Impact of the Financial Crisis

In the last ten years eastern Hungary, with its population of three million, has fallen even further behind the rest of the country. GDP growth has been slower in this region, the employment ratio has failed to rise and unemployment has remained at a stable level above the national average. Of course the global economic crisis has further aggravated this already worrying situation, providing *Jobbik* with an opportunity to appeal to those sectors of the electorate who have felt the effects of the crisis most keenly. With increasing economic uncertainty among the lower middle class, social conflicts and competition for resources have become acute, especially between those with Sinti and Roma roots and the rest of the population. For a large sector of society the hopes placed in the new democratic order following the fall of communism have failed to be fulfilled over the past twenty years. This has fuelled calls for an »anti-establishment« policy of the kind that is part of the fundamental identity of the *Jobbik* party.

The Demise of the Left

A profound change took place in Hungarian party politics between 2006 and 2010 when the social democratic *MSZP* experienced a sharp decline in popularity, even exceeding the dive taken by the right-wing conservative-liberal party *Fidesz* in 1993/94 and representing the greatest loss in voter confidence since the fall of com-

1. Setting off together with the MIÉP; http://www.valasztas.hu/parval2006/hu/09/9_0.html.

2. Gergely Karácsony/Dániel Róna (2010): A Jobbik titka (The Secret of Jobbik), in: *Politikatudományi Szemle*, 2010/1.

3. http://www.politicalcapital.hu/wp-content/uploads/fes_derex_20120229.pdf.



munism.⁴ Within the space of four years the approval ratings for the then ruling socialist party fell by more than half, from 43 to 19.3 percent.⁵ This was partly due to the fact that while in government the socialists had pursued policies diametrically opposed to their election promises and almost their entire term in office was marked by austerity measures and revelations of a string of corruption scandals. The *MSZP* was also weakened by the negative popular opinion of then Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány and his unsuccessful reforms. Disappointed by the policies of the socialist government and receiving no response from other parliamentary parties to their socio-political concerns, the sector of the electorate hardest hit by the austerity measures turned to the extreme right.

Society Shifts to the Right

Parallel to all these developments, a strong shift to the right could be observed in the ideological self-assessment of Hungarian voters. Whereas in 1994 only just under a fifth of Hungarians professed holding conservative values, by 2009 this share had grown to exactly 50 percent, and of these 24 percent even described themselves as extremely right-wing conservative. The collapse of the *MSZP* and of the entire Hungarian left as well as the above-mentioned loss in popularity that preceded it obviously had a role to play in all this not to mention *Fidesz*'s success in forging a [new] identity for itself. Conservative circles, the conservative press and indeed many *Fidesz* politicians themselves subjected voters to a constant stream of not only conservative but also frequently much more radical ideological statements and arguments that ultimately benefited the *Jobbik* party.

2. The Political Orientation and Enemy Perceptions of *Jobbik*

In the following we will outline the ideological and general political profile of *Jobbik* on the basis of its 2010

election programme and some of its principal documents, including the Basic Declaration and the Bethlen-Gábor programme. We filtered out of these documents the issues most characteristic of *Jobbik* policy. Unless otherwise specified, all quotations are taken from these documents, and their undisguised right-wing extremist rhetoric speaks for itself. We also looked at the positions adopted by *Jobbik* members of parliament and their voting behaviour as important indicators of their view of the world. We identified the following nine main themes: anti-communism, law and order, the »gypsy question«, hostility to elites, nationalism, religion, economic policy, globalisation and the EU.

2.1 Anti-communism

The Basic Declaration for Hungary of the *Jobbik* Movement shows clearly that the party's complete rejection of the pre-1990 political system is one of the cornerstones of its identity. This document, dating from October 2003, states that its primary mission is to »keep the communist successor party and the extreme Liberals who have merged with it out of positions of power«.⁶ But overcoming the communist legacy is not the end of the story for *Jobbik*, since it also regards the years after 1990 as a direct continuation of the previous system. It is convinced that fundamentally Hungary has not changed very much and that all the old networks that previously controlled the country have succeeded in retaining their power and are still in place. The logical conclusion for a radically anti-communist party is that the political revolution still needs to be completed.

In *Jobbik*'s 2010 election programme anti-communist statements no longer occupy pride of place. While it is true that alongside those already mentioned, the programme also includes new proposals such as the publication of lists of informers or the idea, borrowed from Poland, that the pension claims of people who occupied leading positions in the one-party state should be re-examined, *Jobbik*'s main attention is clearly no longer devoted to the forty years before 1990. The structure of the chapter (»The last twenty years vs. a better future«) reveals that *Jobbik* is casting judgement not only on the previous regime and its successor party, but on the entire political elite between 1990 and 2010, among which


4. Beck-Bíró Nagy-Róna (2010): Szabadesésben. Az MSZP 2006–2010 közötti népszerűségvesztésének napirendi magyarázatai (In Free Fall – Explanations for the Loss in Popularity of the MSZP 2006–2010), Zsolt Enyedi, Andrea Szabó and Róbert Tardos (eds.): Új képlet. Választások Magyarországon (A New Formula – Elections in Hungary) 2010 Budapest Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja Alapítvány (Foundation Hungarian Centre for Democracy Research) 2011, pp. 193–216.

5. http://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010-es_magyarorsz%C3%A1gi_orsz%C3%A1gy%C5%B1%C3%A9si_v%C3%A1laszt%C3%A1s.

6. *Jobbik*'s Founding Declaration.



Figure 1: Ideological Self-Assessment of Voters 1994–2009



From left to right: very progressive, rather progressive, centrist, rather conservative, very conservative.
Source: http://baloldali.hu/hir/osszetarto_magyarország

it counts both its previous ally and like-minded partner *Fidesz* as well as the *MSZP* or the *SZDSZ*. Thus the right-wing extremists consider the period after 1990 to have been a bad time for Hungary which needs to be overcome.

2.2 Law and Order

As a rule *Jobbik* is equated with law and order in the eyes of the Hungarian public. It openly advocates the death penalty for grave crimes against life, intends to tighten up the Penal Code with a view to better protecting human life and guaranteeing security and property and proposes to introduce work programmes for prisoners. A key element in *Jobbik's* programme is the formation of a National Guard organised on a voluntary and territorial basis. Its general rhetoric also clearly states that the party does not wish to see homeless people in public places.

Jobbik campaigned for the 2010 parliamentary elections using a whole arsenal of rhetoric devoted to the political aim of maintaining public order, and indeed a declared goal of *Jobbik* is to free Hungary »from the networks of political, gypsy and economic crime that are not seldom

linked«. The party's programme leaves no doubt that it believes in the deterrent effect of severe penalties and long prison sentences and in order to make the latter particularly unattractive it would oblige prisoners to work, thus enabling prisons to become self-financing and putting an end to what it calls the »health farm-like« conditions that allegedly currently prevail there. Besides reintroducing local police constabularies it also lists several dozen measures designed to strengthen the police.

2.3 Coexistence with Sinti and Roma

Addressing the so-called »gypsy question« was one of the chief reasons for *Jobbik's* swift rise in popularity in 2009. This breakthrough, however, had a long history to it, the party having already begun using the term »gypsy crime« many years earlier, eventually according it so much weight in its communication with the public that it more or less appropriated the issue. Indeed, following a series of murders, the first in Olaszliszka in 2006, the »gypsy question« rose to the very top of *Jobbik's* agenda.

Jobbik regards coexistence between ethnic Hungarians and Sinti and Roma as one of the most serious »problems« in Hungarian society, if not indeed *the* most seri-



ous »problem«, and it believes it must be tackled via employment and education policy. »Most of gypsy society lives outside the law and outside work and education«, it states in the chapter »Don't go down the gypsy road!« of the 2010 party programme. A later passage states in no uncertain terms that the only way to improve the situation of the Sinti and Roma is to make them adapt to the norms of mainstream society. As a first, unavoidable step it would strengthen the police and create local police constabularies. This would then be followed by further (repressive) steps including the implementation of the principle of »work not welfare«, replacing monetary social benefits with »social cards« or making receipt of child benefit conditional on children attending school.

2.4 Hostility to Elites

Ever since it was founded the *Jobbik* party has consciously tried to employ the strategy used by right-wing extremists in other [post-communist] countries, who portray the political elite that came to power after 1990 as uniform in their betrayal of national interests. It continually alleges that the apparently controversial debates conducted between leading political forces are simply a front to conceal the fact that they are all in league with each other and operate in close-knit networks. *Jobbik's* founding declaration even implies that these close links between establishment parties have global ramifications: »Today's political outfit carries favour with globalism, which is setting out to rule the world.« *Jobbik's* rhetoric has thus right from the start sought to portray national politics as serving international interests, creating a rift between parties and voters, that is between politicians and the public. Or put another way, it believes that Hungary is characterised by »opportunism, lies and corruption«. A leitmotif of *Jobbik's* 2010 election campaign was the term »criminal politicians« which was used to denounce the establishment and became enormously significant in the campaign. As can be deduced from its programme, *Jobbik*, regards all political parties as equally criminal: »Neither the political crimes of the carnation [the emblem of the *MSZP*], nor the orange [the emblem of *Fidesz*]... can continue to remain unanswered any longer«.

With a view to punishing those responsible, *Jobbik* promised in its 2010 election campaign to investigate all major state investment projects and past privatisa-

tion deals as well as proposing to lift the immunity of members of parliament and to include political crimes in the Penal Code as a special category of crime. Other important stated goals were to prohibit the simultaneous holding of several political offices as well as to require all members of parliament to submit to an investigation of their assets at the end of a parliamentary term.

Following its 2010 election success, *Jobbik* was faced with an interesting political dilemma, for having advanced to become a parliamentary party it was now part of that very political elite [it had previously criticised so harshly]. While this did little to change its anti-establishment position, the party's hostility to elites also implied a different style of conducting politics that may be at odds with its status as a parliamentary party. *Jobbik* is thus required to perform a delicate balancing act: to comply with legislative practice it must show professional competence in its work, yet at the same time in order to maintain its credibility with its radical supporters, who favour overturning the entire system, it must also constantly furnish proof that the party does not belong to the »corrupt« elite.

2.5 Nationalism

A recurring element in *Jobbik's* political platform is its determination to represent Hungarian interests. *Jobbik* condemns Hungarian foreign policy of the last twenty years as having failed to take account of Hungary's real interests. From this train of thought inevitably follows the protection of national values and interests as a central political goal. In terms of content *Jobbik*-style nationalism has two sets of goals. Firstly, it strives for economic self-determination, giving Hungarian businesses a competitive advantage and protecting or reclaiming national assets. Secondly, *Jobbik* strikes a revisionist chord, declaring as a goal the reunification of the Hungarian nation via a revision of the Treaty of Trianon concluded after World War I, which led to the loss of large parts of what was then Hungarian territory to neighbouring states.

2.6 Religion

The role of religious belief for *Jobbik* is already implied by its definition of itself as a nationalist Christian party and it has profoundly reaffirmed its commitment to this



founding identity in all public forums. Given its attitude to the church and to religious faith, it is not surprising that the party sets great store by the power of traditional communities to shape the future of Hungary. Its positive attitude to the church is thus practically a foregone conclusion. While religious messages and religious policy have never been among *Jobbik*'s top issues, they are always present in the background as a secondary issue. Thus the party advocates making ethics and religion compulsory subjects at all primary and secondary schools in Hungary as well as registering church weddings with the state registry office. Other frequently repeated programme points are making the legal provisions for abortion more restrictive and giving the church a greater presence in the military, hospitals, educational institutions and prisons.

2.7 Leftist Economic Policies

If we were to judge *Jobbik* solely by its programmatic statements on law and order, religion and the »integration« or rather assimilation of the Sinti und Roma, we would place it squarely at the far-right end of the political spectrum. When it comes to economics, however, things look rather different, for *Jobbik* believes in a strong, active, interventionist state that stands like a protective shield between Hungarian society and the damaging effects of globalisation. This protective attitude together with other welfare state aspects forms the basis for *Jobbik*'s economic policy.

Jobbik favours a progressive taxation system with several different tax brackets, which would require average or below-average earners to pay less tax than the better-off. In its 2010 programme sensitivity to social issues is deliberately connected with sustainability aspects. It is thus no coincidence that the title of the chapter on economic policy – »Eco-social National Economics« – sounds as if it might have been written by the left wing of the Greens – in other words, the *LMP* in the Hungarian political spectrum. *Jobbik* believes in state ownership of a whole series of sectors, such as health and education, the pensions system and the energy market, and envisages (re-)nationalisation for a number of others. It would retain control over strategic national assets and renationalise companies of strategic significance (such as public utilities) that were sold off cheaply to private investors.

2.8 Hostility to Globalisation

If for *Jobbik* »gypsy crime« and »political crime« represent the »enemy within« then the forces and processes of globalisation are the external enemy. Globalisation, the consumer society, foreign capital and multinational companies are all terms of abuse in the lexicon of Hungarian right-wing extremists who consider them an ever-present threat to the Hungarian nation and the embodiment of evil.

The starting point for the party's position is the notion that the political elites have spent the last twenty years serving foreign interests and that therefore a policy that does more to protect national interests is now necessary – a policy that, according to its own self-image, only *Jobbik* is capable of pursuing. As a symbolic demonstration of strength, *Jobbik* repeatedly speaks of a plan to renegotiate state debt. This openly declared campaign to win back economic self-determination is directed primarily at multinationals in Hungary. As a counter-measure *Jobbik* supports the goal of using Hungarian (corporate) capital to exert as great an influence as possible in areas outside Hungarian borders where ethnic Hungarians live.

2.9 Euro-scepticism

There is no better illustration of *Jobbik*'s original attitude to the European Union than its refusal in 2004 to stand for election to the European parliament as a gesture of protest against the integration of Hungary in Europe. »EU membership is unacceptable to us, for it would result in a fatal restriction of our national independence!« – thus the wording of the party's founding declaration. It favours instead a Europe of nations based on loose cooperation between strong, independent nation-states and a variety of national identities.

In its 2010 election programme the party condemned Hungary's membership of the EU as having produced extremely negative results and saw the main reason for the deterioration of the situation of Hungary in the emergence of a European »superstate« that takes no account of the interests of smaller member-states. In view of the current political and economic turmoil in the EU *Jobbik* even supports the idea of Hungary leaving Europe again. At the beginning of 2012 it adopted a much

more radical anti-EU tone than it had before, symbolised by the burning of the EU flag in front of the building housing the EU mission to Hungary.

Jobbik's strong euro-scepticism, which, incidentally, it views not as scepticism but as realism, is rooted in a more general foreign policy orientation that favours ties with the east over European integration (which it sees as having reached an impasse). *Jobbik* believes Hungary should instead cultivate its relations with Russia and the major threshold powers in Asia (China, India, Iran) and the Arab world.

3. The Social Basis – Who Are the *Jobbik* Voters?

On the basis of its election showings, especially in the parliamentary elections of 2010, and its further increase in support since then, we can certainly regard *Jobbik* as a party that has succeeded in establishing itself in the middle of society. Behind a party enjoying such broad popularity there usually stands a broad social coalition. Although one might intuitively assume that supporters of the radical right belong primarily to the margins of society, the data tell a different story in the case of Hungary. Income, for instance, has no significant impact on sympathy for *Jobbik*, nor, apparently, does education, for the party is actually least popular among people with very little education. In fact it has high approval ratings among those with a medium level of education and skilled workers, and the support of these groups has even risen further since 2009. The impact of the crisis and the resulting social frustrations therefore provide only a very partial explanation for why people vote for this radical party.⁷

The most significant factor in support for *Jobbik* is age. The party enjoys a degree of popularity well above average among people under the age of thirty, especially first-time voters, 30 percent of whom voted for *Jobbik*. If, on the other hand, suffrage were restricted to pensioners alone the party would have serious difficulties reaching the 5 percent threshold required to enter parliament. The interesting thing here is that the age composition of the extreme right-wing camp clearly recalls that of *Fidesz* before 1990. In all probability it is not so much attitudes as socialisation (cohort effects) that play a role

in the formation of a radical right-wing identity. Among today's pensioners, who were socialised during the era of the Kádár regime, the *MSZP* is traditionally popular, whereas *Fidesz* always found the most favour with the age group that grew up with the opposition movement in the early 1980s. By contrast, the generation socialised after 1989 has no memory of socialism and they are too young to remember Viktor Orbán as the politician who on 16 June 1989 publicly demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Although *Fidesz* is today still the most popular party even among twenty-year-olds, it does not enjoy the same degree of support among this age group as it does among thirty- or forty-year-olds. This generation has simply not experienced any collective socialisation that would determine their long-term political attitudes. Twenty-year-olds exhibit a much stronger propensity to participate actively in politics and to engage in community building, and this also applies in some cases to their acceptance of a radical political stance. Unlike other older age groups, who have become accustomed to a political culture of conflict-avoidance and to a lack of opportunities to actively participate, the generation socialised after 1989 is more willing to engage in open conflict and to be very active politically. For this reason it is much more difficult for parties like the *MSZP* and *Fidesz*, which are less active on the street or on the Internet, to appeal to young people. This goes a long way towards explaining why *Jobbik* – and to a much lesser extent the *LMP* – is able to fill a vacuum for this generation.

After age, gender is the most conspicuous factor characterising those for whom *Jobbik* is the preferred party. One rarely encounters such an over-representation of men in Hungary outside of this party, perhaps not surprisingly given that most radical parties in Europe tend to be »men's parties«.

The distribution of *Jobbik* voters according to community size shows that the party is most popular in small and medium-sized cities, but enjoys little support in cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants and small towns and villages with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants; moreover, its support is weakest in the capital, Budapest. In addition, the gap between the radicals' strongholds and their »weaker« regions has grown bigger, with the geographical distribution of *Jobbik* voter communities becoming consolidated between 2009 and 2010.⁸

7. Karácsony-Róna, 2010: A *Jobbik* titka, in: *Politikatudományi Szemle*, 2010/1.

8. Source: www.valasztas.hu, www.vokscentrum.hu, own calculations.



Besides sociodemographic and geographical data, we should also look at voter migration in favour of the *Jobbik* party. According to data gathered in a survey, earlier party preferences (before the 2010 parliamentary elections) of *Jobbik* voters were as follows: the majority defected from *Fidesz* (37 per cent); many either did not know or would not say whom they previously voted for or did not vote for (20 per cent); 13 per cent were first-time voters; and 21 per cent said that in 2006 they had voted for the socialist party *MSZP*. This would seem to indicate that some voters have also migrated from the socialists to *Jobbik*.

4. The Influence of Hungarian Right-wing Extremism

As already described, since 2006 *Jobbik* has played an increasingly active role in Hungarian political life. In the following we will first examine what influence the right-wing extremists have had since then on *Fidesz*, the *MSZP* and the *LMP* and are continuing to have. We will then go on to look at media coverage of right-wing extremism.

4.1 The Influence of *Jobbik* on Other Political Forces

Since 2010 the governing party, *Fidesz*, has started to regard *Jobbik* rather than the *MSZP* as its main opponent. Leading *Fidesz* politicians assume that, following its election disaster in 2010 (or the period in government from 2006 to 2010 that was responsible for its downfall), the *MSZP* will take a very long time to re-establish its credibility and that no sudden increase in its voter base is to be expected. *Jobbik*, by contrast, has no problem with credibility and as a »fresh« political force nothing stands in the way, theoretically at least, of its picking up the support that *Fidesz*⁹ has lost since the elections. In reality, however, there are a number of important factors that speak against a further increase in support for *Jobbik*. The first is that *Jobbik*, even after entering parliament, has remained a classic right-wing extremist party. It has made no move to moderate either the statements or the political style of its election campaign, which, in turn, restricts its potential voter base. Second, *Fidesz* has

repeatedly claimed for itself issues on which the right-wing extremists campaigned,¹⁰ either translating them into legislation or else using their extremist messages for their own purposes.

The following table shows clearly just how many of the measures taken by the *Fidesz* government originated with *Jobbik*. In each case, two statements apply: (1) they were neither components of *Fidesz*'s original election programme nor of the positions it held as an opposition party from 2006 to 2010; (2) they were included in *Jobbik*'s election programme but have been realised by *Fidesz* as the governing party since 2010.

However obvious *Jobbik*'s influence on the policies of the right-wing-conservative governing coalition may be, it would nevertheless be wrong to believe that this is limited only to *Fidesz* and the *KDNP*. For actors in Hungarian party politics *Jobbik* signifies a challenge that they cannot afford to ignore. The currently largest opposition party, the *MSZP*, ruled out any form of co-operation with *Jobbik* while still in government, a stance it continued to adhere to after 2010. The *MSZP*'s position as a traditionally anti-racist party that rejects social prejudices is clearly expressed both in its founding programme¹¹ and statutes¹² and in its political statements. However, having now recognised that they did not pay enough attention to the integration of the Roma and the development of eastern Hungary during their two terms in office from 2002 to 2010, the socialists have now made these policy issues a main focus in the party's programme committee and other platforms.¹³ Paradoxically, it has taken *Jobbik*'s election success to make the *MSZP* aware of the issues it neglected to address during its term as governing party.

A telling example of the influence of the right-wing extremist discourse on Hungarian politics is the so-called »Monok model«.¹⁴ This refers to the principle of state aid in return for work introduced by the socialist

9. http://tenytar.blog.hu/2012/02/23/nepszeruseg_orban_gyurcsany_nyomaban.

10. http://www.policysolutions.hu/userfiles/elemzesek/Policy%20Solutions_Mi%20maradt%20a%20Jobbiknak.pdf.

11. http://www.mszp.hu/sites/default/files/j%20lr%C3%A1nyt%C5%B1_0_0.pdf.

12. http://www.mszp.hu/sites/default/files/A%20MAGYAR%20SZOCIALISTA%20P%C3%81RT%20ALAPSZA_B%C3%81LYA_0.pdf.

13. http://www.delmagyar.hu/belfold_hirek/majus_elsejere_kesz_az_mszp_valasztasi_programja/2266498/.

14. <http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20080707-monoki-modell-szocialis-segely-nem-megoldas-a-kotelezo-kozmunka.html>.



Figure 2: List of Government Measures Inspired by *Jobbik*, 2010–2012

Quotations from <i>Jobbik</i> 's 2010 election programme	Measures implemented by the <i>Fidesz</i> -government since 2010
»The multinationals' contribution to tax revenues is negligible, they use accounting tricks to make profits disappear and take them out of the country.«	The Orbán government has imposed a special tax ¹⁵ on the telecommunications branch, energy providers and retail chains. These sectors are mainly in the hands of foreign companies, usually multinationals.
»We will abolish compulsory private pensions and lead the pension' system back towards a state arrangement, in which individual account-holding would nevertheless remain. We will enable free choice of pension fund and abolish obligatory membership of private pension funds.«	<i>Fidesz</i> has nationalised savings paid into private pension funds. Unlike <i>Jobbik</i> 's proposal, however, moving to the state system is not optional. ¹⁶
»In contrast to the wild excesses of neoliberal education policy <i>Jobbik</i> advocates awarding marks and where necessary repeating the school year.«	<i>Fidesz</i> and the <i>KDNP</i> have reintroduced the awarding of marks and repeating a school year into the education system. ¹⁷
»The principle should be made clear that the Holy Crown and the Hungarian State as well as the Holy Crown and the Nation (consisting of members of various nationalities and religions) are identical. The Holy Crown signifies the Hungarian State in official texts and legal regulations.«	The reference to the Holy Crown has been made part of the Constitution: »We honour the achievements of our historical constitution and the Holy Crown, which embody the constitutional state continuity of Hungary and the unity of the Nation.«
» <i>Jobbik</i> will pass a media law creating new value-oriented media with public status. The criteria for such media will be [the contribution they make] to building a national identity and to communicating knowledge and balanced information of all kinds; in place of the current practice, which takes years, we will facilitate the rapid imposition of penalties on individual media organisations.«	<i>Fidesz</i> has passed a new media law for which it even changed the constitution to ensure its approval. The law says that the Orbán-government will put all Hungarian media organs under the surveyance of government-appointed monitors. ¹⁸ The preamble to this bill contains the same »value-oriented« arguments as those advanced by <i>Jobbik</i> . The draft law grants the media watchdog comprehensive options for imposing sanctions.
»We would make it obligatory in at least one of the upper years of primary schools for the children to go on a school trip to the Hungarian territories seized from us.«	A government initiative has been launched that allows all pupils attending public educational institutions to receive state funding for at least one trip to an area of a neighbouring country inhabited by Hungarians. The basis for this is the draft decision approved by parliament in October. ¹⁹
»We will anchor Hungary's Christian roots in the constitution.«	The reference to Christianity has also been included in the constitution: »We are proud that our King, St. Stephan, placed the Hungarian state on a firm foundation a thousand years ago and made our homeland part of a Christian Europe.« »We recognise the role of Christianity as the guardian of the Nation.«
»We will remove the Károlyi-Statue from Kossuth square immediately. We favour the re-building of the Regnum-Marianum Church, which was blown up as a result of an arbitrary decree issued by Stalin and Rakos. Roosevelt Square will be given the only name worthy of it, that of Count István Széchenyi!« »The names of public places associated with negative historical figures or epochs will be abolished and their statues brought to appropriate places.« »In memory of Miklós Horthy, Albert Wass, Pál Teleki, Ottokár Prohászka, Cecile Tormay, Béla Hamvas and our other great figures who have been unworthily forgotten. Together with civil society we will launch a nationwide program to erect statues in public places.«	In March 2012 the Károlyi statue was removed from Kossuth Square. The <i>Fidesz</i> majority in the Budapest city parliament changed the name of Roosevelt Square to Széchenyi Square. The application for the change submitted by <i>Fidesz</i> and the <i>KDNP</i> to the city administration states: »No public square, no public institution may bear the name of a person involved in the foundation, setting up or maintenance of a political system of arbitrary rule in the 20 th century, nor a name that is an expression of or the name of an organisation that directly refers to or recalls a political system of arbitrary rule in the 20 th century.« ²⁰ One square has been named after Albert Wass. ²¹



For foreign currency mortgage borrowers who default on their debt we will declare an immediate moratorium on mortgage foreclosures for a period of a year. At the same time we will abolish the power of banks to unilaterally alter contracts and make it compulsory in the case of mortgages running over a period of more than three years to allow borrowers to defer repayments for a period of 6–12 months at least once without incurring additional conditions or penalty interest. Should foreclosure become unavoidable, the owner should first be given at least six months to try to sell the flat on the free market before it is auctioned off.	In spring 2011 following a motion proposed by a Fidesz member of parliament the Bailiffs Act was amended to extend the moratorium on foreclosures in force until 15 April by a further two and a half months.²² As part of a package of legislation in support of mortgage borrowers, the parliament had already previously issued a ban on unilateral alterations of contracts by the banks.²³ Among the measures introduced by the government to protect foreign currency mortgage borrowers was the option of pre-mature repayment of foreign currency debts in a single payment and at a fixed exchange rate.
»With the goal of preventing politicians from simultaneously holding several paid offices we will prohibit members of parliament from holding the office of mayor as well as membership of local or county parliaments.«	In March 2012 the government party proposed a draft bill which stipulated that it was impossible to be a member of parliament and hold the office of mayor at the same time. ²⁴
On the day of the constituent meeting of parliament <i>Jobbik</i> proposed a motion that would declare the anniversary of the Trianon Treaty a day of national remembrance.	At the end of May 2010 the parliament declared the day of the signing of the Trianon Peace Treaty a day of national unity. ²⁵
»We intend to break with the treasonous political practice pursued by both the MSZP and Fidesz and by other parliamentary parties characterised by an obsequious serving of European Union interests even at the expense of Hungarian interests. Here we need only recall the hasty conclusion of the EU accession negotiations in a spirit of self-denial, the unconditional EU accession of Romania or the rapid approval of the Lisbon Treaty without even reading it. <i>Jobbik</i> will, if necessary, adopt a confrontational attitude towards Brussels. If we have to choose between the interests of the nation and the interests of the union, we will not be afraid to decide in favour of our homeland and nation.«	The Orbán government's EU policy has tended to be characterised by a willingness to engage in conflicts and to put national interests ahead of those of the EU. The government's communications have often contained criticism of the institutions of the European Union and the EU rhetoric of the prime minister in Hungary itself has become increasingly radical. ²⁶

government in 2008. Fidesz amended the programme in 2010/2011, both considerably lowering the wage paid for community work (from ca. HUF 60,000 to 47,000 for full-time work²⁷) and at the same time expanding the categories of people to whom it could be applied.

The aim of both the MSZP and the Fidesz programme was to respond to social pressure to abolish the »free« status of state benefits – however, small these may be. In return for paying this support, local councils are able to require those receiving them to perform community work. The initiative for this reform of the welfare system originally came from the mayor of Monok, Zsolt Szepessy (hence the name »Monok model«); but it was the right-wing radicals who were the first to seize on this initiative and strongly propagate it.²⁸ Thus what was initially regarded as a marginal policy gradually became socially acceptable in all political camps and was eventually translated into (government) policy.

The party »*Lehet Más a Politika*« – LMP (»Politics can be different« – LMP) exhibits major similarities with *Jobbik* in two respects: its anti-establishment position

15. http://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20101018_kulonado_parlament.

16. http://www.fn.hu/belfold/20101124/annyi_magannyugdijpenztaraknak/.

17. <http://www.mr1-kossuth.hu/hirek/itthon/lehet-majd-buktani-es-osztalyozni-az-also-tagozaton.html>.

18. http://hirszerzo.hu/belfold/20101126_sajtofelugyelet_mediatorveny_Szalai.

19. <http://csepel.info/?p=11244>.

20. http://hvg.hu/itthon/20111109_Fidesz_KDNP_kommunista_utcanek.

21. http://www.vasnepe.hu/kozugyek_politika/20110427_nevcserek_budapesten_szell_kalman_ter.

22. <http://www.metropol.hu/cikk/702498>.

23. <http://www.jogiforum.hu/hirek/24000>.

24. <http://mno.hu/belfold/a-fidesz-benyujtotta-az-orszaggyulesrol-szolo-torvenyjavaslatot-1060189>.

25. <http://www.hir24.hu/belfold/2010/05/31/esz-trianon-emleknapi-junius-4-en/>.

26. http://index.hu/belfold/2012/03/16/orban_elnaspangolta_az_eu-t/.

27. http://index.hu/belfold/igazamiigaz/2012/02/17/47_ezer_forintot_kapnak_akik_eddig_28_5_ezret/.

28. See p. 7 above and the quotation from *Jobbik*' 2010 parliamentary election programme »Radical Change«, Chapter »Leaving the Gypsy Road«: »Instead of social benefits community work should be given to all those capable of working.«



and its war on corruption. Like *Jobbik*, the *LMP* condemns the political elite of the past twenty-two years without differentiating between conservatives and left-wing-liberals. One of the *LMP*'s most important messages is that the country must rid itself of corruption and this is increasingly becoming the focus of its political activities, as evidenced not only by its speeches in parliament but also by its appearances at other events and press conferences.²⁹ According to an analysis of the Median opinion research institute, *Jobbik* and the *LMP* are competing for disenchanted voters who are fed up with corruption. The survey shows that »the *LMP* has in some places gained ground at the expense of *Jobbik*. Both parties are popular with young people but their anti-establishment attitudes and outrage at corruption scandals have probably brought many protest voters closer to the *LMP* rather than to *Jobbik*.«³⁰

Unlike the *MSZP*, the *LMP* does not try to keep *Jobbik* in »quarantine«, asserting that a party that enjoys the support of 16 percent of the population cannot simply be ignored. The *LMP*'s more open attitude to *Jobbik* is illustrated by the fact that the deputy chairman of the *LMP* parliamentary group, Gergely Karácsony, in July 2011 proposed a »technical coalition« with the right-wing extremist party. Its idea was that if the opposition parties – the left-liberal *MSZP* and *LMP* and the right-wing extremist *Jobbik* – joined forces in the 2014 parliamentary elections, they could win the two-thirds majority in parliament required to change the constitution and election law tailored by *Fidesz* to suit its own interests (the law entailed a redrawing of electoral constituency boundaries and the requirement to submit a notarised list of candidates) and thus force the dissolution of parliament and the holding of new parliamentary elections. However, both the *MSZP* and *Jobbik* rejected this proposal on principle. A coalition of this kind would not only have meant the opposition parties »temporarily« renouncing their ideologies but their disparate ideas would also have made it very difficult to fight an election campaign.³¹ Nevertheless, the proposal for a technical coalition should be interpreted not as an ideological rapprochement between *Jobbik* and

the *LMP*, but rather as a declaration of opposition to *Fidesz*, with the aim of drawing attention to the fact that the governing majority, in the opinion of the left-wing-green party, had seriously violated the rules of democracy (for example, by introducing a media watchdog).

4.2 Right-wing Extremism in the Media

Neither in Europe generally nor in Hungary has a general consensus been reached in recent decades about how the media should treat extremist political formations.³² Although Hungarian analysts are generally of the opinion that *Jobbik* receives comparatively little coverage or airtime given the level of voter support for this party, this applies only to the mainstream media (television, radio, print media). For one thing, *Jobbik* has actually been rather successful in creating its own alternative media,³³ and for another, the media do not necessarily have to report directly about a party to bring it to public attention but can also provide it with indirect publicity by devoting a lot of space to the controversial issues it stands for. Of course this is a two-track process, for a party will succeed in communicating if it is able to present a clearly identifiable and apparently competent position on issues that matter to a majority of people.

In her study on the treatment of right-wing radical issues in Hungary Judit Barta³⁴ identifies three tendencies in past and present media treatment of the statements of right-wing extremist politicians. First of all, there is the approach of the left-liberal Hungarian media to the phenomenon of right-wing extremism, perhaps best described as »over-dramatisation«. ³⁵ A good example of this is the 2004 affair over anti-Semitic statements by Diana Bácsfi, a philosophy student and leader of the group »Hungary's Future«. On that occasion a solitary right-wing extremist managed to attract so much media attention that the impression was created that Hungarian society was faced with a group enjoying broad public support,³⁶ although at that time this was not yet the case. Thus the

29. <http://lehetmas.hu/sajtokozlemenyek/30448/az-lmp-korrupcios-tabloval-jarja-a-varosokat/>.

30. <http://www.median.hu/printcikk.ivy?artid=7c017750-53b9-4a03-87c6-a771ee519bb8>.

31. http://belfold.ma.hu/tart/cikk/a/0/105006/1/belfold/Ciki_a_techikai_koalicio_csupan_csak_techikailag_lehetetlen.

32. <http://nms.sagepub.com/content/8/4/573.abstract>.

33. Karácsony-Róna (2010) oder http://www.politicalcapital.hu/letoltes/20091028_PC_Latelet_2009.pdf.

34. http://www.mediakutato.hu/cikk/2008_04_tel/05_szelsojobb_a_magyar_sajtoban.

35. http://www.policysolutions.hu/userfiles/elemzesek/Policy%20Solution_s_B%C5%B1nbakk%C3%A9p%C3%A9z%C3%A9s_%C3%A9s_ant-rasszizmus.pdf.

36. Vgl. <http://www.nzz.ch/aktuell/startseite/article9whfy-1.317894>.



media tend to exaggerate a problem and respond to it in a rather general way glossing over details that may actually be relevant, thus leaving the field open for right-wing extremists to respond with populist, demagogic and usually extremely damaging proposals. What makes this strategy particularly problematic is that by ignoring specific issues, such as the Sinti and Roma question, it allows the right-wing extremists – in this case *Jobbik* – to create the impression in the eyes of the electorate that it is the only party competent to deal with this issue.

The second fundamental tendency is to trivialise right-wing extremism as a problem that is not serious and will go away again of its own accord, hence rendering it socially acceptable. Moreover, it is not only some media organisations that fail to take the phenomenon of right-wing extremism seriously but also rival parties, such as the *LMP*, which as mentioned above, found it perfectly acceptable to propose forming a »technical coalition« with *Jobbik*.³⁷ In this way a dangerous phenomenon tends to get played down by some of the media, which portray it as insignificant and hence not really a problem. This is the approach currently being taken to *Jobbik* by public television, which does not distinguish between it and other non-radical opposition parties.

A third problem with the approach taken by the mainstream media to radical ideologies is their – thinly disguised – support for certain *Jobbik* theses; this applies primarily to the conservative print and electronic media close to *Fidesz*. One could compile a long list of examples that would include the anti-Sinti and Roma statements made by Zsolt Bayer,³⁸ a journalist close to *Fidesz*, the appearances on Echo TV (regularly cited on *Jobbik*'s unofficial online platform the website *kuruc.info*³⁹) of Ferenc Szaniszló, another journalist who occupies a similar position to Bayer, or the many articles in the newspapers *Demokrata* and *Magyar Hírlap*.

As far as the general presence of *Jobbik* in the traditional media is concerned, the same thing basically applies to state radio as it does to television: maintaining a presence in the mainstream media has become very difficult for all opposition parties since *Fidesz* took over government in 2010. References to *Jobbik* in the news, for ex-

ample, are the exception rather than the rule (6 per cent of all reports), while the *LMP* has been almost totally excluded from the most popular radio news broadcast »Mid-day Chronicle« (1 per cent).⁴⁰ It is even more difficult for *Jobbik* to get itself mentioned in the political programmes of private radio stations. According to a study by the think tank Policy Solutions,⁴¹ there was one week in which *Jobbik* did not occupy a single second of airtime on the radio stations *Class FM* and *Neo FM*, which is all the more significant given that hundreds of thousands of people regularly listen to these two stations⁴² and they are hence major shapers of opinion, most particularly in the younger age groups.

For the print media no study currently exists that would confirm the over- or under-representation of *Jobbik*, although unlike the state electronic media the print media have no obligation to engage in balanced reporting. Despite the lack of studies, however, it can be regarded as a fact that those newspapers that take a generally positive attitude to *Jobbik* are not the most widely distributed ones. Those that do feature the party include the weekly *Barikád* (Barrikade), which comes out every Thursday in a print run of 10,000,⁴³ as well as the free tabloid *Hazai Pálya* (Home Game) two million copies of which (according to the party) are distributed all over Hungary and which carries political articles.

Jobbik was therefore forced to create its own alternative media world on the Internet,⁴⁴ which later became one of the keys to its success, for online platforms proved to be the most effective means for *Jobbik* to become recognised and popular among the younger generation. Between 2006 and 2010 *Jobbik* set up an online network, in which a crucial role was played not only by interconnected news portals but also by community media, which with technological advances were becoming ever more important. The party recognised this fact very quickly, and since then has switched to communicating via various social networks, thus reaching far more people than larger party organisations with more voter support manage to.

37. See p. 11.

38. For example: <http://mn.mno.hu/portal/379046>.

39. <http://kuruc.info/r/35/74249/>.

40. http://www.policysolutions.hu/userfiles/elemzesek/PS%20m%C3%A9rdiaelemz%C3%A9s_MR1_D%C3%A9li%20Kr%C3%B3nika.pdf.

41. http://www.policysolutions.hu/userfiles/elemzesek/Policy%20Solutions_Kereskedelmi%20r%C3%A9di%C3%B3k.pdf

42. http://www.kreativ.hu/kutatas/cikk/a_class_fm_es_az_mr1_kossuth_a_leghallgatottabb_radio.

43. [http://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barik%C3%A1d_\(%C3%BAjs%C3%A1g\)](http://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barik%C3%A1d_(%C3%BAjs%C3%A1g)).

44. Bíró Nagy-Róna (2010).



Jobbik's main forum for online communication is the portal *kuruc.info*, which is visited 65,000 a day⁴⁵ and propagates a much more radical and more overtly neo-Nazi ideology than the party does in its official statements and documents. Other portals include *barikad.hu* with 20,000 visits a day and *hunhir.hu* with 12,000, which are thus very frequently visited websites by Hungarian standards. And the list of websites with right-wing content does not stop there either, but also includes *nemzetihirhalo.hu*, *nemzetiegyletek.hu*, *szebbjovo.hu*, *mariaorszaga.hu*, and *szentkoronaradio.hu*, to name but a few.⁴⁶

However, as already mentioned, *Jobbik* is making inroads not only into online news portals and the print media, but into social media as well. The party's official video clip, for example, received four million clicks during the 2010 parliamentary election campaign, whereas that of *Fidesz* received only 157,000 clicks.⁴⁷ Data from Google Trends also indicate that over the same period the main Internet search engines registered by far the most interest in *Jobbik* of all the parties standing for election.⁴⁸ During the first month of the last election campaign (February 2010), for example, more visitors clicked on reports featuring *Jobbik* than on all the reports featuring *Fidesz*, *MSZP* and the *LMP* put together. *Jobbik* has more »friends« on Facebook than *Fidesz*, twice as many as the *LMP* and even four times as many as the *MSZP*, which is considered a newcomer to social media.

5. Proposals for How to Deal with Right-wing Extremism

In the following we make some suggestions about how Hungarian democratic parties should counter right-wing extremism. Our fundamental thesis is that political parties need to take a two-pronged approach and should seek simultaneously to decrease both the »demand« (for right-wing extremism) and the »supply« (forces representing right-wing extremism). In recent years *Fidesz* and the *LMP* have been mainly con-

cerned with the demand side and both have focused on how to treat the causes of right-wing extremism. In a bid to find solutions to problems that may favour the rise of right-wing extremism they have shown a commitment to law and order⁴⁹ and introduced a special Sinti and Roma programme⁵⁰ as well as community work⁵¹ and rural development programmes.⁵² On the supply side – with a special focus on the right-wing extremist arguments and policies of *Jobbik* – they have tended to take a rather passive, resigned stance or in some cases have actually adopted some of the right-wing extremists' arguments themselves. By contrast, the *MSZP* has concentrated almost exclusively on the supply side, seeking to isolate or »quarantine« right-wing extremist ideas and parties in order to »protect« society from the growth of right-wing extremism. The socialists have concerned themselves with the demand side only in isolated instances. A rare exception in this respect is the programme »The Road to Work«. In our opinion the best solution would be to combine these two approaches in a number of ways that we outline below.

Regional, Positive Discrimination

Growing social differences and the danger of a further decline of the lower middle class are important breeding grounds for radical views. The best illustration of this is the fact that *Jobbik* won more than 20 percent of the vote in 2010 in precisely those regions of north-east Hungary which have fallen further behind the rest of the country in economic and social terms over the past ten years. The gap between the entire east of Hungary and other parts of the country with respect to economic development, unemployment and the potential to prevent out-migration has grown steadily over the past decade. One element of the regional development policy of various previous governments was a kind of positive discrimination towards regions and sub-regions, whereby more resources were allocated to less developed areas. At the same time, however, the state continued to employ the universality principle in most

45. Source: Medién Webaudit.

46. For a full list see: Bíró Nagy - Róna (2010).

47. http://www.policysolutions.hu/userfiles/elemezések/Boros%20Tam%C3%A1s_A%20lehengerl%C5%91t%C5%91%20a%20%C3%A1thatatlanig.pdf.

48. Ibid.

49. <http://www.fidesz.hu/index.php?Cikk=146948> und <http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20110502-modosult-a-btk-az-egyenruhas-bunozes-miatt.html>.

50. http://lehetmas.hu/upload/57/57/201004/LMP_romaprogram.pdf.

51. http://lehetmas.hu/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/kozmunkaprg_e.pdf.

52. http://lehetmas.hu/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/lehet_mas_a_videk.pdf.



areas of policy, i.e., it did not make any regional differentiation its taxation, social, law and order or educational policy. We would recommend that it apply a positive discrimination principle in these areas too, in other words that it offer police officials, teachers, doctors and other public servants financial incentives to go and work in north-east Hungary. If it was made worthwhile for the best people to take jobs in Hungary's structurally weak regions this would not only lead to better public services, but would also make this part of the country more attractive for Hungarian and foreign employers especially if this were supplemented by tax and social insurance breaks. In this way a backward region would have a chance to catch up.

Democracy Programmes

In recent years the first generation in Hungary without any direct negative experience of totalitarian systems, dictatorships or radical ideologies has reached adulthood. Educating this generation in democratic values and democratic practice as well as sensitising them to the dangers posed by radical ideologies are therefore important preventive measures. Democracy programmes should be a component of formal education so that the values that go hand in hand with a democratic order are communicated to whole generations. Another important measure would be to introduce democracy programmes outside formal education (in the form, say, of training, exchange programmes, competitions or trips abroad), so that young people do not simply regard these values as just another obligatory part of the school curriculum. Another way of promoting the political socialisation of young people would be to allow secondary school students to take out a free subscription to a daily newspaper of their choice that does not communicate radical values.

Community Programmes

One of the reasons why young people find right-wing extremism so attractive is that it gives them a sense of community. Concerts, events, books and organisations affiliated with political parties appeal to young voters at an emotional rather a rational level and in this way convince them to vote for extremist parties. It is therefore important for democratic parties, too, to become

involved in the individualisation process and to offer an alternative to right-wing extremist ideology in the form of community programmes and experiences.

Sow Doubts About the Competence of Extremists

As social resistance to radical ideologies decreases, casting *Jobbik* as a bogeyman has less and less effect. Moderate parties can only counter right-wing extremism effectively if they sow doubts not only about its ideology but also about its competence. Since most political forces reject any contact with *Jobbik*, its policy proposals, such as »a territory reserved for gypsies for the protection of public order (!)« or leaving the European Union, do not meet with any response and thus come to be regarded as legitimate in the eyes of the public. Thus an effective way to counter right-wing extremism would be for left-wing-liberals, say, to treat them just like any other opponent – i.e. to call into question the party's professionalism and that of its leading politicians and to communicate this convincingly to the electorate.

Training Journalists

In many countries the media tend to take an isolationist approach to right-wing extremist parties and to try to »quarantine« them in a bid to restrict their access to the media. However, in Hungary the success of *Jobbik* has shown that this method also strengthens the »underdog« effect, and actually makes the party more attractive for young people. It also avoids forcing the other parties to find their own answers to the problems addressed by *Jobbik*. The approach we would suggest would be first of all to offer journalists additional professional training, to agree on an ethical code of journalistic practice and only then to allow *Jobbik* to appear in the media. Part of this training would take journalists abroad to learn about tried and tested methods for dealing with the discussion practices of right-wing extremist politicians, to receive assistance in formulating arguments against populism and to become aware of the responsibility of the media for defending democratic values. An ethical code for journalists working in the mainstream media could lay down all the principles to which journalists should adhere in reporting on extreme right-wing tendencies.



Working with the Grassroots of Moderate Parties

One reason why the right-wing radicals are in a position to occupy a considerable segment of the political »market« is that other parties do not succeed in placing their »product« among numerous social groups. What this means in practice is that *Jobbik* is doing comprehensive work at the grassroots, staging citizens' forums and other similar events, maintaining a local presence in everyday life and organising citizens' initiatives, whereas the other parties' contact with their voters is limited to the media. The solution here is for moderate parties to increase their presence, in other words moderate parties too must become more active in small communities that have recently become neglected and at events attended by 18- to 25-year-olds.



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